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LITTLE F.T.C. ACT: THE NEGLECTED
ALTERNATIVE
by RICHARD A. SCHULMAN*
INTRODUCTION
As the consumer advocates become increasingly aware of
the assorted dangers and promotional schemes associated with
products on the market, a higher degree of consciousness is
awakened in both the purchasing public and the legislature. The
function of the latter is to protect the public from defects
designed in the product and deceptions which are defrauding the
consumers and to assure businessmen that such practices will not
unduly hinder their market. Accordingly, consumerism has
recently become a popular cause which is necessary to assure
protection to those who have neither the time nor facilities to
adequately protect themselves.
Illinois has recently embarked on a new consumer protection
act entitled the "Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act,"' popularly known as the "Little F.T.C.," the breadth
of which is beyond the protection previously afforded to consumers and businessmen competing against those engaged in
unfair practices. 2 The scope of this article is to familiarize the
practitioner with the new approaches available in Illinois consumer actions and to demonstrate the magnitude of possibilities
under the Little F.T.C.
BACKGROUND

The Federal Trade Commission Act 3 was adopted in 1914 with
the intention of protecting against unfair trade practices in interstate commerce. 4 A condition precedent to relief under the
F.T.C. Act, as first enacted, was the necessity of proving that
competition existed and was aggrieved by the alleged misconduct. 5 The breadth of this legislation was expanded in the
* B.S., University of Illinois; J.D., The John Marshall Law School.
Mr. Schulman is with the firm of Deutsch, Levy &Engel.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211 , §§ 261 et seq. (1961) as amended P.A.
78-904, § 1 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as the Little F.T.C.].
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 261 et seq. (1961) [hereinafter referred to as the Consumer Fraud Act] and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 311
et seq. (1966) [hereinafter referred to as Deceptive Trade Practices Act].
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 et seq. (1914).
4. F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).

5. Id. at 647. The Commission issued a complaint against Raladam
for unfair methods of competition. The Court affirmed the court of appeals reversing the Commission's order against Raladam because of the
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Wheeler Lea Amendment (1938)6 which provided that it was no
longer necessary to prove that competition existed or that it
was injured by the alleged conduct. The F.T.C. was thereby
enabled to commence proceedings for violations of the Act which
detrimentally affected consumers. 7
The precedents so established by the amended statute's scope and longevity cover a
myriad of factual situations creating a sound foundation for any
state statute predicated on the F.T.C. Act. Starting in 1966, the
F.T.C. was attempting to do just that-to promote state legislation using the F.T.C. Act as its basis.
In 1967, model legislation emerged from discussions with the
Federal Trade Commission and state officials and the "Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act" was drafted., By
1969, some states had already adopted the proposed Little F.T.C.0
but the F.T.C. issued a revised proposal1 ° which was more comprehensive than the 1967 edition. The new proposal allowed the
consumer to bring his own action without the necessity of using
the Attorney General, to receive treble damages in some instances,1 and to eliminate the holder in due course status of
12
transferees in installment transactions.
lack of jurisdiction. The decision was primarily based on the fact that
none of the competitors were called to testify that the conduct would
adversely affect their business.
6. Act of March 21, 1938, PUB. L. No. 447, 52 Stat. 111, amending
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1914).
7. Under the F.T.C. Act, only those methods of unfair competition
and deceptive practices which affect interstate commerce are subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission.
8. The first version of the legislation published appeared in the
Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation for 1967.
Revised versions appeared in Council of State Governments, Suggested
State Legislation for 1969 and the Council of State Governments, 1970
Suggested State Legislation.
9. Hawaii (1965 & 1969), Massachusetts (1967 & 1969), North Carolina (1969), Vermont (1967 & 1969), and Washington (1961).
10. Letter from Paul Rand Dixon to Philip S. Hughes, April 23, 1969.
11. The provision suggesting treble damages was not adopted in Illinois. Even though the Sherman Act, Robinson-Patman Act, and Clayton
Act are within the protective scope of section 5 of the F.T.C. Act [F.T.C.
v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966)] and are thereby incorporated
into the standards of the Little F.T.C., one who seeks an action for antitrust violations should first resort to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 60-1 et seq.,
which is the Antitrust Act of Illinois wherein acts in violation of the
antitrust laws are enumerated. Included in section 60-7 is a provision
for treble damages for individuals who have been injured by the conduct.
When an antitrust matter is involved, one would resort first to the Antitrust Act because of the allowance for treble damages and the clear delineation of what conduct violates the Act. This preexisting antitrust act
was probably the reason that the Little F.T.C. did not include a treble
damages provision as was suggested in the model legislation; to have
adopted it would have been repetitive. The Antitrust Act of Illinois can
be as valuable a tool as the Little F.T.C. when there are antitrust violations, but only under the former can one recover treble damages. However, one must also heed the fact that the anti-competitive conduct not
previously covered by the Illinois Antitrust Act, e.g., Robinson-Patman
price discrimination, may now be within the purview of the Little F.T.C.
12. The elimination of the holder in due course status in installment
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The most important features, however, of these two sets of
proposals were that: 1) "unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices" are to be construed in light
of the decisions under the F.T.C. Act; 2) there is to be a centralized agency, the Attorney General's Office, to enforce the Act;
3) an individual who has been injured by the unlawful conduct
can bring his own cause of action with the right to collect, in
addition to damages, attorney fees and court costs; and 4) civil
damages may be awarded to the state as a further deterrent
13
to such wrongs.
While the F.T.C. was attempting to provide consumer
protection in states without any consumer protection laws or
without adequate protection, Illinois had adopted two acts-the
Consumer Fraud Act 14 and the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act'" -which encompassed some of what the F.T.C.
had proposed. Illinois, apparently sensing that these two acts
were inadequate to meet the demands of consumer protection,
acted on the suggestions of the F.T.C. in House Bill 1548 (1973
session) 16 which became effective on October 1, 1973.
To
date, there are forty-seven other states which have adopted
comparable Little F.T.C. Acts.18
UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND DEcEPTIvE ACTS

When utilizing the Little F.T.C., particular attention should
be focused on section 2, for therein the Act provides that "[i]n
construing this section consideration shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal
courts relating to Section 5(a)' 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. § 45(a)]."
Prior to this provision, the Consumer Act of Illinois had no
such reference to the decisions of the F.T.C. Act and the state
was compelled to create its own case law to determine which
contracts was not adopted in Illinois. The provision advanced was not
a total elimination of the status but the burden would have shifted to
the holder to prove that he was in fact without knowledge of any claims
or defenses and that he purchased the contract in good faith-the presumption of good faith would no longer exist.
13. Letter from Paul Rand Dixon to Phillip S. Hughes, April 23. 1939.
14. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121%, §§ 261 et seq. (1961).
15. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 311 et seq. (1966).
16. House Bill 1548 (1973 Session) was introduced by Telscher, Blair,
W.D. Walsh, K.W. Miller, Hyde, Rose, Duff, Porter, North, Philip,
Griesheimer, and Palmer.
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1212, §§ 261 et seq. (1961), as amended P.A.
78-904, § 1 (1973).
18. The only states which have not enacted "Little F.T.C. Acts" are
Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee.
19. Section 262 of chapter 121
provides: "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices ... are hereby declared
unlawful. ..."
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conduct was violative of the consumer laws-a burden which
dictated indecisiveness on the part of all concerned.
This section of the Little F.T.C. is designed to synthesize the
criteria upon which conduct is to be characterized as an unfair
method of competition or a deceptive act. These standards are
essential to a firm foundation of the Little F.T.C. and their precedent value will be of immeasurable assistance to all who intend
to utilize the Act. 20 With the incorporation of the case law
under the F.T.C. Act and the standards so established, most
factual situations will have been decided and all parties subject
should be well apprised of the legality of
to the Little F.T.C.
21
their conduct.
What is "Unfair Competitionor Deceptive Acts"?
Since the F.T.C. Act of 1914 concerned itself only with unfair
competition and was absent the amendment relating to deceptive
acts, the earlier cases pertained to that limited area. In A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 22 the Court held that:
Unfairness in competition has been predicated of [sic] acts which
lie outside the ordinary course of business and are tainted by
fraud, or coercion, or conduct otherwise prohibited by law ...
What are 'unfair methods of competition' are thus to be determined in particular instances, upon evidence, in the light of particular competitive conditions and of23 what is found to be a
specific and substantial public interest.
The abstractness of the definition of unfair competition is
further demonstrated in Federal Trade Commission v. R.F.
Keppel & Bro., Inc.24

Therein the Court made the point that

unfair competition depends upon situations rather than a congressional standard and the standard should be flexible such that
innovators cannot circumvent any pre-determined criteria.
Congress, in defining the powers of the Commission, thus
advisedly adopted a phrase which, as this Court has said, does
not "admit of precise definition but the meaning and application
of which must be arrived at by what this Court elsewhere has
called 'the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.' "25
20. In an article by William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice

Legislation, 46 TuL. L. REv. 724 (1972), he stated that the most important
facet of the adoption of the F.T.C. proposals is the common definition
of what constitutes "unfair or deceptive acts or practices."
21. The decisions reviewing F.T.C. orders to cease and desist are published in six volumes and three paperback supplements entitled Statutes
and Decisions, Federal Trade Commission.
22. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
23. Id. at 532-33. F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), defined unfair
competition as those practices which are opposed to good morals since
they depict deception, bad faith, fraud and oppression.
24. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
25. Id. at 312.
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The intended scope of the F.T.C. Act of 1914 can be demonstrated best by a House Conference Report which reasoned why
general language ("unfair methods of competition") should be
used rather than a concise definition.
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair
practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field.
Even if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and
prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over again.
the method of definition, it would
If Congress were to adopt
26
undertake an endless task.
The rather vague definitions of unfair competition are
complemented by a seemingly non-existent definition of what
constitutes a deceptive act. The cases under the F.T.C. Act predicate liability on the impressions 27 left with the purchasers
either from statements made by the seller 28 or innuendos resulting from the seller's representations. 29 These deceptive acts are
more often based on the factual situations rather than a concrete
rule.3 0 Once again, Congress has avoided a concise definition
in order that all deceptive acts are included, not just those
enumerated.
Acts against both competitors and purchasers are unfair in
that an unjust advantage is gained by the perpetrator of the
wrong. Since the party who creates the disadvantage is operating unfairly against both the public and competitors, all such
acts will be denoted as unfair competition for the purpose of this
article.
Unfair Competition in Advertising
Acts Against Competitors
When section 5 of the F.T.C. Act was enacted, the intent of
Congress was to combat trade practices which exhibited a strong
potential for stifling competition 3 1 while preserving competitive
practices so long as they did not have a tendency to unduly
26. H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
27. Continental Wax Corp. v. F.T.C., 330 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir.
1964); National Bakers Service, Inc. v. F.T.C., 329 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir.
1964); Country Tweeds, Inc. v. F.T.C., 326 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1964);
Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. F.T.C., 304 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962).
28. Korber Hats, Inc. v. F.T.C., 311 F.2d 358 (1st Cir. 1962).
29. National Bakers Service, Inc. v. F.T.C., 329 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir.
1964); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. F.T.C., 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1953).
30. The fact that merchants are so ingenious in designing new
methods of deceiving the public or competitors is one of the shortcomings
of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Under the Act, there is
a list of "deceptive practices" and the list concludes with the words "engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding." If the precedents of the F.T.C. are utilized
rather than the first-impression wisdom of the Illinois judges, there may
be greater protection afforded to consumers and competitors under the
Little F.T.C.
31. F.T.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 225 (1968); Atlantic Refining
Co. v. F.T.C., 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965).
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hinder competition,3 2 create monopolies or become oppressive.3
The criteria were measured by the reasonableness of the conduct
in light of its impact upon the competitive structure3 4 and where
the conduct was not inherently unlawful and unfair, the experito determine
ence of competitors was an additional yardstick
3
whether unfair competition was being exercised. ,
Some cases in which unfair competition was found to have
existed between competitors are more obvious than others, but
the subtle cases are what might go undetected if diligence is not
exercised. A more blatant instance arose in White Tower System,
Inc. v. White Castle System.30 White Tower had used the same

shape of buildings, a similar name, and a similar slogan of the
well-established White Castle in an attempt to secure a region of
the country that the latter would undoubtedly enter. White
Castle had sought an injunction against this practice and in
affirming the issuance of the injunction by the district court, the
appellate court held that "[u]nfair competition is 'a convenient
name for the doctrine that no one should be allowed to sell his
goods as those of another.' 137
A more subtle instance of unfair competition is F.T.C. v.
Royal Milling Co.38 Royal Milling had merely packaged flour
but the packaging indicated that they actually milled it. The
Supreme Court found this to be unfair competition since some
consumers and dealers bought directly from the mill to avoid
the cost of middlemen. As a consequence of the deceiving
labels, the other flour mills had lost potential business as a
direct result of the inference raised by the economy-saving
labels. The competitors did not prove how much business had
been misdirected to Royal Milling, but the evidence raised the
inference that there had been some harm done to them by virtue of the unfair competition. In this instance, the competitors
did not prove actual damages since, as the Supreme Court set
forth in later cases, an action by the F.T.C. is adequate, so long
as a "not insignificant volume of commerce" 39 has been affected

by the unfair burden. This requirement was apparently shown
by the mere potential of deception and inferences raised from
the false labels.
32. F.T.C. v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924); F.T.C.
v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920); F.T.C. v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp.,
57 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1932).
33. F.T.C. v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924); F.T.C.
v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1932).
34. Union Circulation Co. v. F.T.C., 241 F.2d 652, 656 (2d Cir. 1957).
35. F.T.C. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923); F.T.C. v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1932).
36. 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1937).
37. Id. at 69.
38. 288 U.S. 212 (1933).

39. F.T.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 230 (1968).
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Another point requiring mention is that some practices are
fairly well known in commerce to be a misrepresentation of fact
(advertising 6% financing when the actual time balance amounts
to 11.5%).4o This fact, however, is inconsequential since "[a]
method inherently unfair does not cease to be so because those
competed against have become aware of the wrongful prac41
tice.,
In F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co.,4 2 Algoma and others had
represented their lumber for over 30 years as "California white
pine," which naturally created the impression that it was white
pine. In point of fact, it was yellow pine which had inferior qualities to that of white pine. The dealers in the California area were
aware of the nature of the pine but as the market for the pine
increased toward the eastern states, those who dealt with the
lumber were less knowledgeable of its true qualities. Those
dealers who were aware of the misnomer did not relay such information to the customers in the East who thought that they were
purchasing white pine. This practice was declared to be a
method of unfair competition since those lumber mills which did
sell white pine were unjustly burdened in their business due to
the detraction of customers.
Acts Against the Public
Just as the consumer advocates are more interested with the
effect of company products and policies, so are the most recent
decisions. Ever since the Wheeler Lea Amendment allowed
actions where deception against the consumer constituted an
actionable offense under the F.T.C. Act, the cases have been predominantly instances where purchasers have been deceived by
advertisements. Consequently, an immense number of cases
exist from which one can ascertain how the Illinois courts should
respond to situations wherein an advertisement is claimed to be
deceptive.
The basic criteria for ascertaining whether or not an advertisement is deceptive are: (1) whether such advertisement is
"likely to deceive"; 43 (2) the net impression that it is likely to
make on the general populace; 44 and (3) the predictable infer40. Ford Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941).

41. F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922).
42. 291 U.S. 67 (1934).

43. American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. F.T.C., 255 F.2d 289, 293
(8th Cir. 1958).

44. F.T.C. v. Standard Education Soc., 302 U.S. 112 (1937); F.T.C. v.
Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C.

Cir. 1968); National Bakers Service, Inc. v. F.T.C., 329 F.2d 365, 367 (7th
Cir. 1964); F.T.C. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963); Feil
v. F.T.C., 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960); Kalwajtys v. F.T.C., 237 F.2d 654
(7th Cir. 1956); P. Lorillard Co. v. F.T.C., 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950);
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45
ences a prospective customer is likely to draw therefrom.
Examples of cases bearing out these standards indicate that it
is unfair competition to advertise a drug as a cure-all where no
evidence was shown that it could cure anything; 46 to advertise
an all wool good when it had mixed materials; 47 to procure
information as a prerequisite to receiving "free" money when the
48
and to represent
information was used by a collection agency;
the price of a product as a sale price when it was actually the
49
same as the regular price.

In short, the overriding consideration in determining whether an advertisement is deceiving is as follows: "The important
criterion is the net impression which the advertisement is likely
to make upon the general populace." 50 This standard, however,
is not based on any fine distinctions and arguments that can be
made in support of the representation; rather, it is predicated
on the effect that these statements may reasonably be expected
to have upon the general public.5 1 The representations .need
not be literally false in order to fall within the proscription of
the F.T.C. Act 52 (and now the Little F.T.C.). If the statements
should prove to be literally true but technically false, a suffi53
cient deception may have occurred to warrant action, and should
there be a possibility that the statements are susceptible to both
a truthful interpretation and a misleading one, the statement will
be construed against the advertiser. 54
Parker Pen Co. v. F.T.C., 159 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1946); Charles of
the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944); Stanley
Labs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 138 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1943); Aronberg v. F.T.C.,
132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942); Ford Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 120 F.2d 175, 182
(6th Cir. 1941).
45. Korber Hats, Inc. v. F.T.C., 311 F.2d 358 (1st Cir. 1962); Aronberg
v. F.T.C., 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
46. Koch v. F.T.C., 206 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953).
47. Gimbel Bros. v. F.T.C., 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941).
48. Bennet v. F.T.C., 200 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
49. Spiegel, Inc. v. F.T.C., 411 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1969).
50. Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d
Cir. 1944); see note 44 supra.
51. U.S. Retail Credit Assoc., Inc. v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.
1962); P. Lorillard Co. v. F.T.C., 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950).
52. F.T.C. v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1963);
Moretrench Corp. v. F.T.C., 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942).
53. Country Tweeds, Inc. v. F.T.C., 326 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1964);
Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. F.T.C., 304 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962); Koch
v. F.T.C., 206 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953); Bennett v. F.T.C., 200 F.2d 362,
363 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Bockenstette v. F.T.C., 134 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1943).
54. In Country Tweeds, Inc. v. F.T.C., 326 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1964),
the manufacturer had its new line of cashmere tested against its old line.
The report carefully explained that certain results indicated an insignificant difference between the products but the manufacturer deleted certain clarifying statements in the report and compared various results in
such a manner that it appeared as though there had been a major improvement in the cashmere. This was accomplished by using data which
was literally true but which was presented in a distorted way so that
the report apparently praised the new line of cashmere while it, in fact,
gave the new cashmere the same rating as the old one. The court re-
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Once again, it must be kept in mind that since these types
of actions are concerned with wrongs committed against the public rather than against a competitor, there is no need to show
that competitors were injured in any way. All that need be
proven is that there is a burden imposed upon the consumer by
the advertiser 55 and the consumer was, in some manner, misled
or deceived into purchasing the product.
The next problem is to ascertain the standard to which the
advertiser is subjected in terms of the ability of a person comprehending the meaning of the advertisement's representations. In
F.T.C. v. Standard Education Society, 56 encyclopedia purchasers
were solicited by salesmen representing that the volumes were
being given away free as an advertising plan. The customers
only had to purchase a loose leaf extension service at a price
of $69.50. In actuality, the $69.50 was the retail price of both
the encyclopedia and the loose leaf service. The court held that:
The fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those
who are trained and experienced does not change its character,
nor take away its power to deceive others less experienced.
There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the honesty
of those with whom he transacts business. Laws are made to
protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. The best element
of business has long since decided that honesty should govern
competitive enterprises, and that the rule of caveat57 emptor
should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception.
This same notion was later stated in Aronberg v. F.T.C.58 as
follows:
The law is not made for experts but to protect the public,that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking
and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to
analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general
impressions. 59
The cases under the F.T.C. Act have held advertisers to a
high standard in the use of language in their advertisements.
The language is carefully scrutinized such that it cannot have
a double meaning and the representations must be displayed
such that all readers are readily aware of those essential parts
of the ad which would distinguish the advertisement from a
alized that the representations were literally true but held against the
manufacturer because the over-all impression was deceiving; the representations were literally true but technically false and that was sufficient
to find that unfair competition had existed.
55. Koch v. F.T.C., 206 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1953); Parke, Austin
& Lipscomb v. F.T.C., 142 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1944).
56. 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
57. Id. at 116; see Feil v. F.T.C., 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).
58. 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
59. Id. at 167.
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deceitful one. " , The Commission has the responsibility to protect the casual, one might even say the negligent reader, as well
as the vigilant and more intelligent and discerning public.6 1
These requirements as to fairness and truthfulness of advertising are not to preclude the permissible amount of puffing
which most advertisers utilize to assist in the promotion of their
product. The parameters of this asset are limited to the extent
of the common law requirements in that a seller has some latitude in puffing his goods but he is not authorized to misrepresent them or assign to them benefits or virtues they do not
62
possess.
Besides puffing, a statement of opinion which affects
commerce may also be outside the purview of the F.T.C. Act and
the Little F.T.C. In Scientific Manufacturing Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission,6 3 Force, the president of Scientific Manufacturing, published two articles alleging the dangers to health
from poisoning which attend the use of aluminum utensils in
the preparation and storage of food for human consumption.
These articles were false, but they were the honest belief of
Force. Furthermore, neither Force nor his company were in any,
way connected with the sale, manufacture, or distribution of
cooking utensils of any sort.
The F.T.C. was awarded a cease and desist order because the
articles were "false, misleading and disparaging. ''6 4 The court,
however, reversed the order by stating that:
Surely Congress did not intend to authorize the Federal Trade
Commission to foreclose expression of honest opinion in the
course of one's business of voicing opinion. The same opinion,
however, may become material to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission and enjoinable by it if, in wanting in proof
or basis in fact, it is utilized in the trade to mislead or deceive
the public or to harm a competitor. 65
The significance of this decision appears in the above
language of the court: should there be an honest opinion which
may affect trade, the F.T.C. lacks jurisdiction unless the pro60. Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., 327 U.S. 608 (1946); F.T.C. v. Standard
Education Soc., 302 U.S. 112 (1937); Niresk Industries, Inc. v. F.T.C., 278
F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960); Parker Pen Co. v. F.T.C., 159 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.
1946); Progress Tailoring Co. v. F.T.C., 153 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1946); Dorf-

man v. F.T.C., 144 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1944); Charles of the Ritz Distrib.
Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944); Parke, Austin & Lipscomb
v. F.T.C., 142 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1944); Aronberg v. F.T.C., 132 F.2d 165
(7th Cir. 1942).
61. Parker Pen Co. v. F.T.C., 159 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1946). Parker
had advertised a guarantee on its pens in large print, but in smaller and
less obvious print, it recited that a small fee had to be sent in to get
the guarantee. The court held this to be unfair competition.
62. Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., 150 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1945).
63. 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941).
64. Id. at 641.
65. Id. at 644-45.
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moter or creator of the opinion has his own business interests
at stake in circulating the unfounded opinion.
Intent to Deceive
Whether the unfair competition has been directed at competitors " " or at the consumer,6 7 the prerequisite intent has been
judicially established under the F.T.C. Act. In either instance,
the decisions have held that unfair competition does not depend
upon good faith or bad faith on the part of the advertiser; all
that matters is that a deceptive practice has been exercised.68
To establish a cause of action, there need not be proof or an
allegation that the representation was intentional 9 since the
purpose of the Act is to protect consumers and competitors
regardless of the design of the advertiser. The rule was set forth
in F.T.C. v. Sterling Drugs:
* . . [P]roof of intention to deceive is not requisite to a finding
of violation of the statute . . . since the purpose of the statute

is not to punish the wrongdoer but to protect the public, the
cardinal factor is the probable effect which the advertiser's
70
handiwork will have upon the eye and mind of the reader.
The Little F.T.C., however, deviates from this established
rule and the variance may prove to be catastrophic should the
judiciary read the act to require intent in all instances, or should
businessmen produce advertisements which artfully avoid the
consequences of the act. Section 2 of the Little F.T.C. states that
[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices . . . with the intent that others rely upon the conceal-

ment, suppression or omission of such material fact, or the use or
employment of any practice described in Section 2 of the 'Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act'
unlawful ....

. . .

are hereby declared

The specific problem arises from the mention of intent as a prefix
to concealment, suppression or omission and is, on its face, a
deviation from the F.T.C. Act which requires that no intent be
66. F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934); L. & C. Mayers
Co. v. F.T.C., 97 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1938).
67. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. F.T.C., 379 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1967);
Ford Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941); Gimbel Bros. v.
F.T.C., 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941); F.T.C. v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.
1928).
68. F.T.C. v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963); Charles
of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944); Stanley Labs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 138 F.2d 388, 392-93 (9th Cir. 1943); Ford
Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941); Gimbel Bros. v. F.T.C.,
116 F.2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1941); General Motors Corp. v. F.T.C., 114 F.2d
33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940).
69. F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber, 291 U.S. 67 (1934); Pep Boys-Manny,
Moe &Jack v. F.T.C., 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941); Gimbel Bros. v. F.T.C.,
116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941); F.T.C. v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1928).
70. 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).

362

The John MarshallJournal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 9:351

proven for any misrepresentations."' As such, the Illinois legislature has diminished the effectiveness of the Act by prescribing
intent as an element when an inference has been raised in the
72
consumer's mind by a deletion or omission of material facts.
The obvious advantage gained by an advertiser in an action
brought against him for a violation of the Little F.T.C. Act is
the necessity of proving intent by the petitioner should the advertiser decide that certain facets of his product should not be
made known to the public. This burden is one which should
not have been imposed upon an aggrieved purchaser.
The second problem raised by the language of the section
is a matter of construction: is intent a modifier of both "concealment, oppression, or omission" and conduct where affirmative misrepresentations have been made? By careful examination of the language of the Act, intent only modifies deletions
of material facts and it should be construed accordingly. Any
other construction would be contrary to the language and intent
of the- Act.
Accordingly, intent is an element of a cause of action for
misrepresentation where material facts have been omitted but
it need not be proven where material facts have been affirmatively presented by the advertiser or seller.
MisrepresentationsGenerally
Since the enactment of the F.T.C. Act, there have been some
interesting cases which, at first blush, would not appear to be
sufficient to warrant an action by the F.T.C. Actions, nonetheless, have been taken with results favorable to the Commission.
Perhaps some of these cases will shed some light on the possibilities open to the Attorney General, the consumer and the competitor who seek recourse under the Little F.T.C.
In Parke, Austin & Lipscomb v. F.T.C. 7 3 the petitioner was a
corporation engaged in the publication and distribution of books.
The Smithsonian Institution and petitioner had negotiated an
agreement whereby a set of books written and edited by the
scholars of the institute would be published and distributed
by the petitioner's subsidiary. The institute was to receive a
71. See note 69 supra.

72. The original House Bill 1548 was drafted without the word "intent" in it. Mrs. Marie Eldon, Assistant Attorney General, was the
draftsperson of the Bill and she has advised this author that it was intentionally deleted from the Bill so that the Act would have the maximum
effectiveness in deterring unfair methods of competition or deceptive acts
or practices. The Bill, obviously, was altered from this original form
to what it is now somewhere between its submission and final passage.
Mrs. Eldon speculates that it occurred on the floor of the House during
final debate.
73. 142 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1944).
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10 per cent royalty on the books. The subsidiary adopted the
name of Smithsonian Institution Series, Inc. at the request of
the institute to indicate a relationship between the parties.
However, when the salesmen of the petitioner sold the books,
the impression that most purchasers received was that the
Smithsonian Institution was receiving all of the proceeds from
the purchase since it appeared as though the publications were
coming directly from the institute rather than a private organization. These salesmen represented that they were employees of
the institute and that the persons who were solicited were specially chosen by virtue of their social standing or influence or
some commendable deed which enabled them to become patrons
of the institute. Despite the fact that the petitioner had carefully
instructed its salesmen against such practices, the cumulative
effect of the misrepresentations was sufficient to warrant a cease
and desist order by the Commission.
In Bankers Securities Corp. v. F.T.C.,74 the defendant had
represented that there was a sale on carpeting and that it would
be sold at $10.89 or $10.95 per square yard while the carpet was
regularly sold at prices between $15.95 and $16.95 per square
yard. In fact, this carpet was sold regularly at the stated prices
in other stores but this was the first time the defendant had
offered it for sale. The court held this advertisement to be
within the scope of section 5 of the F.T.C. Act because the
impression left with the consumer was that there had been a
reduction in the store's regular price when in fact there was no
regular or usual price. This case stands for the proposition that
in order to claim a discount on the regular price of a product, the
product must have been sold by the store previously-the price
75
in other stores is insignificant in ascertaining a regular price.
In Arnold Stone Co. v. F.T.C.,76 the defendant had been in
the business of manufacturing building materials composed of
about 75 per cent crushed natural stone and about 25 per cent
cement. The Commission sought an injunction because the
defendant had called his product "cast stone." The facts showed
that none of its users (architects, contractors, engineers) had
been deceived as to the nature of the product but the contention
by the Commission was that the name had the tendency and
capacity to deceive. The court rejected the Commission's argument and stated that:
74. 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961).

75. In Spiegel, Inc. v. F.T.C., 411 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1969), regular

price was defined as "the price at which the article is openly and actually

sold on a regular basis for a reasonably substantial period of time in
a recent and regular course of business."
76. 49 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1931).
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The remote possibility or fanciful theory of private injury is not
enough to authorize the commission to issue an order to cease
and desist from a business practice which cannot77reasonably be
said to constitute an unfair method of competition.
The particular importance of this decision is that under either
the F.T.C. Act or the Little F.T.C., the commercial context must
be given consideration and the potentiality of the representations
must be considered against commercial practices and knowledge.
Effect of Little F.T.C.
The importance of the Little F.T.C. in the areas of unfair
competition against competitors and the public is primarily the
establishment of standards of conduct which will warrant actions
against the advertiser.7 8 Prior to the adoption of the Little F.T.C.,
the case law was so minimal that the Illinois courts had no
criteria upon which to decide whether or not the advertiser had
gone beyond those limits which are now clearly delineated by
reference to the F.T.C. Act. Regarding unfair competition against
competitors, the Illinois decisions had not established the degree
of effect that such conduct had to have upon other businesses in
order to invoke an action. Further, there were no cases dictating
the standards for businesses where the business community within a certain locale was uniformly aware of misleading practices
but the businesses outside the area and the public in general
were ignorant thereof.
Similarly, the protection of the public has been enhanced due
to the production of standards under the Little F.T.C. The
standard now is whether or not an advertisement is likely to
deceive, and if there is any question as to whether or not the
representations are literally true or technically false, it will be
construed against the advertiser. Furthermore, the laws are to
protect all persons who might read or hear them since the less
suspicious are to be protected as well as those who may be more
aware of frequent misrepresentations in advertising.
The fact that there need not be an intent to deceive where
material facts have been misrepresented is essential since it
makes the task of the injured party that much easier and
77. Id. at 1019.
78. In addition to the foregoing standards dictated by the case law,
the Federal Trade Commission has the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations pertaining to section 5 of the F.T.C. Act. Attention should
be focused on these guides for they provide standards which should be
given the same consideration as the case law. These rules and regulations include the following: "Guide ConcerningUse of the Word 'Free'

and Similar Representations," "Guides Against Deceptive Advertising of
Guarantees," "Guides Against Bait Advertising," "Guides Against Debt
Collection Deception," and "Guides Against Deceptive Pricing."
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eliminates what would otherwise be an affirmative defense-one
which may be hard to overcome. By the same token, the greatest
shortcoming of the Act is the requirement of proof of intent to
deceive where the advertiser has deleted material facts. Caution
must be exercised by the petitioner in bringing an action predicated on this situation for this may be the most essential part
of the case in order to prevail.
The Little F.T.C. will benefit greatly by the case law establishing these standards under the F.T.C. Act.
UNFAIR ACTS OR PRACTICES

While the preceding section elaborates on what constitutes
an unfair method of competition or a deceptive act, there still
remains the question of what constitutes "unfair acts or practices." Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act does provide that unfair acts
or practices are declared unlawful but this aspect of the Act has
not received the same attention as the other portions of section
5. While this section had been unexplored in the past, the
Supreme Court has recently created what is known as the "fairness doctrine." This doctrine can be used as a wedge into practices which were seemingly beyond the reach of the F.T.C. and
now the Little F.T.C.
The fairness doctrine evolved from Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. 79 Briefly, the facts are that
the respondent, Sperry and Hutchinson, sold stamps to merchants who gave them to customers, the number of stamps
received by the customers dependent upon the size of their purchase. Some of the customers, however, found themselves with
too few stamps to redeem them for merchandise. Realizing this
dilemma, some individuals established exchange centers where
a person could trade his stamps for cash, buy more books of
stamps to have enough to redeem them for merchandise, or to
exchange stamps they do not normally collect for stamps that
they do collect (exchange of "competitive" stamps). Sperry and
Hutchinson feared these activities, believing that it would reduce
customer proclivity to return to green-stamp-issuing stores and
thus lower the store's incentive to buy and distribute S & H
stamps. In order to prevent this practice, Sperry and Hutchinson placed a notice in every stamp book stating that the holder
of the stamps could only redeem the stamps for merchandise
from Sperry and Hutchinson unless the holder had prior written
consent. Furthermore, in following up on this notice, Sperry and
Hutchinson, between the years 1957 and 1965, filed for 43 injunc79. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).

366

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 9:351

tions against the exchange centers and mailed 315 threatening
letters to merchants and centers that redeemed the stamps. In
almost all instances, the threat or reality of suit forced the
businessmen to abandon this practice.
The court was confronted with the issue of whether ".
§ 5 empower[s] the Commission to proscribe practices as unfair
or deceptive in their effect upon consumers regardless of their
nature or quality as competitive practices or their effect on
competition."' 0
The Court stated:
Thenceforth, unfair competitive practices were not limited to
those likely to have anticompetitive consequences after the
manner of the antitrust laws; nor were unfair practices in
commerce confined to purely competitive behavior ...
' * . The [Wheeler Lea] amendment added the phrase 'unfair
deceptive acts or practices' to the section's original ban on
'unfair methods of competition' and thus made it clear that
Congress, through § 5, charged the FTC with protecting consumers as well as competitors.
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us
that the Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive
power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive,
but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court
of equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined
in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws. 8 '
Consistent with the concept of fairness is the Court's comparison of the F.T.C. and courts of equity. The Court seemingly
enlarges the jurisdiction of the F.T.C. Act to cover conduct which
may not be violative of any laws but is inequitable to the consumer.
The precedent relied upon by the Court to substantiate the
fairness doctrine is both the language of the F.T.C. Act and
Federal Trade Commission v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc.82 Keppel
& Brother sold candies in "break and take" packs, a means of
merchandising that induced children to buy greater amounts of
inferior candy in the hope of finding bonus packs containing extra
candy and prizes. The F.T.C. issued a cease-and-desist order
under section 5 on the theory that the marketing scheme contravened public policy by tempting children to gamble and compelling competitors to abandon their scruples by similarly tempting children. The Court sustained the F.T.C.'s conclusion that
the practice was unfair by reasoning that ". . . the competitive
method is shown to exploit consumers, children, who are unable
to protect themselves."' 3
80. Id. at 239.

81. Id. at 244.
82. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
83. Id. at 313.

1976]

Little F.T.C. Act

The unfair practice doctrine was further incorporated into
the F.T.C. Act standards by requiring that when advertisements
make assertions that appear to be based on scientific evidence,
they must, in fact, be reasonably founded. In 1973, the Federal
Trade Commission rendered its opinion in a complaint against
Pfizer, Inc.,8 4 regarding allegations claiming Pfizer had conducted
an unfair practice. The complaint alleged that the claims by
Pfizer as to the qualities of one of its products, Un-Burn, had not
been substantiated by scientific proof prior to the making thereof.
The Commission affirmed the hearing officer's opinion which dismissed the complaint for failure to prove lack of reasonable
reliance on scientific substantiation, but the opinion delineated
the standards for advertisements which make affirmative representations as to the quality of a product which appears to be
scientifically supported.
As the Commission stated:
• ..the Commission is of the view that it is an unfair practice
in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act to make an
affirmative product claim without a reasonable basis for making
that claim .... Absent a reasonable basis for a vendor's
affirmative product claims, a consumer's ability to make an
economically rational product choice, and a competitor's ability
to compete on the basis of price, quality, service or convenience,
are materially impaired and impeded.8 5
The opinion noted that the "standard of reasonableness" is
not an absolute, but one which is governed by a case-by-case
analysis. The facts upon which any claim is to be made, however,
must be ascertained prior to any such assertions, for a subsequent
affirmation does not establish a reasonable basis for a claim
previously made.
In order to have had a reasonable basis, the tests must have
been conducted prior to, and actually relied upon in connection
with, the marketing of the product in question. Nor does the
fact that the product subsequently performed as advertised indicate that there is a lack of public interest in the matter. The
fundamental unfairness results from imposing on the consumer
the unavoidable economic risk that the product may not perform
as advertised; that is, at the time of sale, neither the consumer
nor the vendor have a reasonable basis for belief in the affirmative product claims.86
The tests which are necessary for any such assertions should
be well-controlled scientific tests which simulate the anticipated
usage of the product. These tests, however, need not be conducted in connection with the immediate product, but may be
84. F.T.C. v. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 56 (1972).
85. Id. at 62.
86. Id. at 67.
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founded on experimentation conducted with similar products or
ingredients or on medical literature containing reports of adequate and well-controlled tests. Reliance may not be had on the
fact that comparable products make similar claims and have
similar ingredients unless it is known that they have conducted
the appropriate scientific tests. While the Pfizer decision did not
find against the respondent, it did create the requirements of
and standards for an advertiser who makes claims about its products which appear to be substantiated by scientific proof.
The recent adoption of the fairness doctrine by the F.T.C.
opens innumerable doors which were seemingly closed prior to
Sperry & Hutchinson. On March 4,1974, the F.T.C. made a press
release which announced an investigation into debtor suits by
Montgomery Wards and Spiegel, both of Chicago. Apparently,
both companies were having default judgments entered in courts
which were extremely inconvenient to the debtor-so inconvenient that the debtors rarely would appear simply because of the
expense necessary to get to court. The courts where the suits
were filed had proper jurisdiction and these companies had a
right to have the judgments entered therein, but the F.T.C. is
pursuing the matter because it feels that the practices, though
lawful, are simply unfair to the consumer. This is an instance
of the potential breadth of the F.T.C. Act and the Little F.T.C.
should the Attorney General or an individual decide to capitalize
on the fairness doctrine.
This area warrants close examination since it may eliminate
practices which are not contrary to antitrust laws or illegal
otherwise, but are adverse to the concept of fairness.
STATE AND PRIVATE CAUSES OF AcTION

Proper Partiesand Remedies
Under the F.T.C. Act, there is no right to a private action
because of conduct declared unlawful under section 5 of the
Act.8 7 Similarly, under the Consumer Fraud Act of Illinois,
there was no provision allowing for an action by an individual;
only the Attorney General could bring an action.88 The Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, however, permits only actions
by individuals 9 (not the Attorney General) but the relief thereunder is limited to injunctions.90
87. Atlantic Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Marquette
Cement Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C., 147 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1945); La Salle
Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004,
1006 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
88. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 262-63 (1961).
89. Id. § 313 (1973).

90. Id.
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The Little F.T.C., however, specifically provides that actions
can be brought by either an individual or the Attorney General 1 The obvious advantage to the consumer is that he is
assured that his complaint will be diligently pursued inasmuch
as a complaint previously filed under the Consumer Fraud Act
would only be pursued if the Attorney General's office felt that
an action was warranted and that it had the time and manpower
to do an adequate job. With these new provisions for consumer
enforcement, the consumer can regulate the litigation entirely
since it is brought in his own name. 9 2 The Attorney General
also benefits in that he may now seek relief which is more
deterring to violators of the Act and more clearly related to the
harm done to the public.
The parties to be named in the complaint for violation of
the Act are obviously those who made the misrepresentations
which created the possible deception of consumers. Section
10(b) (3), however, goes further in that it, by implication, provides that the disseminator of the deceptive advertisement may
additionally be liable if the advertisement were accepted for publication with knowledge of its falsity or the disseminator had
a financial interest therein. Proving knowledge on the disseminator's part may be an onerous task, but if financial strings can
be established, and additional party may find himself sharing
a judgment.
Even though an individual may bring the action, a problem
which the drafters foresaw was the likelihood of minimal damage
awards, a certain discouragement of private actions. The Little
F.T.C. compensated for the expected small awards by allowing
recovery of reasonable attorney fees and costs should the individual prevail. 3 By the same token, the legislature foresaw the
possibility of harassment litigation and provided for recovery of
attorney fees and costs to whichever party prevailed.9 4 The
new Act was designed for private actions but not as a license
to sue on unfounded or frivolous claims which are essentially
a means of harassment. The aforementioned provision allowing
for costs and attorney fees for the prevailing party is a necessary
tool for the injured party, yet it serves as a shield to the party
alleged to have acted in violation of the Act.
A further deterrent to unfair competition is the civil dam91. Id. §§ 267, 270a.
92. A question which is unanswered by the Little F.T.C. is whether
class actions will be permitted thereunder. The Act itself is silent on
the question but the concept of class actions would be consistent with
the intent of the Act, the types of relief available, and the provision allowing costs for the prevailing party.
93. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , § 270a (1973).
94. Id.
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ages that may be awarded to the state when the Attorney
General brings the action.9 5 In the cases under the F.T.C. Act,
the only relief is a cease and desist order which amounts to a
slap-on-the-wrist dictating that the particular practice be terminated. It is indeterminable as to who in particular is injured
by the practice; therefore, no monetary damages are awarded
and the only relief that the Commission can receive is the
elimination of the practice by the particular violator in the
future. But, by the time a judgment or consent order is entered,
most of the damage has already been done and the company has
made its profits and perhaps planted its advertising with the public such that the advertising will serve to its benefit long after
the wrongful practice had been ordered to cease and desist.9 6
The F.T.C. apparently realized this dilemma and in its two
drafts of proposed model legislation for the states, it recommended a $25,0001T and $2,00098 civil penalty, respectively, for
each violation of the Act. The Illinois Little F.T.C. went further
than either proposal and adopted a provision that allows the
court, in its discretion, to assess a civil penalty not to exceed
$50,000. 99 This monetary penalty is in addition to the relief
available previously under the Consumer Fraud Act and now the
Little F.T.'C.; said relief includes injunctions, dissolution of the
corporate charter, revocation of any license, or any other equitable relief the court deems necessary. 10 0 These equitable forms
of relief would certainly be the most harmful to the business
conducting unlawful practices (e.g., revocation of license) but the
courts will probably be reluctant to impose these penalties since
they are so severe. Some of the cases prosecuted under the
F.T.C. Act will substantiate this hesitancy by the courts' ° 1 and
as a consequence, the alternative relief of a monetary penalty
95. Id. § 267.
96. An excellent example of the continued effect of the deceptive advertising occurred in F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374
(1965). Colgate advertised "Rapid Shave" shaving cream by using the
"sand-paper mask" test. Colgate was enjoined from using the advertising in the future because of the deceptive mock-up but, by this time,
the advertising had made an impression on the viewing public and no
order by the Commission could curtail that effect unless they would go
so far as to order corrective advertising.
97. Letter from Paul Rand Dixon to William D. Carey, April 14,
1966.
98. Letter from Paul Rand Dixon to Philip S. Hughes, April 23,
1969.
99. ILL. Rgv. STAT. ch. 121%, § 267 (1973).
100. Id.
101. See F.T.C. v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); F.T.C.
v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933); Country Tweeds, Inc. v. F.T.C.,
326 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1964); Union Circulation Co., Inc. v. F.T.C., 241
F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957); Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., 150 F.2d 106 (5th Cir.
1945); L. & C. Mayers Co. v. F.T.C., 97 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1938); F.T.C.
v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1928); Eastman Kodak Co. v. F.T.C., 7
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1925).
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is required to enforce compliance with the new standards. Therefore, this large civil penalty should work effectively in reprimanding those businesses engaged in unfair practices whose
conduct is not severe enough to warrant a dissolution or forfeiture of license.
In addition to the attorney fees and costs, the Act appears
to provide for punitive damages in an action by an individual. 10 2 The Act specifically provides for "any other relief
which the court deems proper"10 3 and punitive damages would
appear to be included in the scope thereof. To further substantiate this, the Act has specifically allowed punitive damages
to actions brought by the Attorney General ($50,000 per violation). Since the same ends are sought, it would be inconsistent
to contend that the Act did not authorize the same type of relief
to an individual when he brings an action predicated on the
same or similar violation as that which entitles the Attorney General to punitive damages.
The importance in this area of the Little F.T.C. should be
abundantly clear-a greater number of persons can bring the
actions and the penalties for the violation should serve as an
effective deterrent to those contemplating such practices. Perhaps most important is the ability of the individual to bring his
own action based on the unfair competition and the inclusion
of a provision allowing for recovery of attorney fees and costs
to the prevailing party. These provisions allow for greater protection to the consumer and competitor but still discourage
harassment litigation which would impose an unwarranted burden on the honest businessman.
Elements Necessary to Bring an Action
The decisions under the F.T.C. Act dictate that "the public
interest must be specific and substantial"'1 4 and where a controversy is essentially private in nature, the F.T.C. lacks jurisdiction. 0 5 The Little F.T.C., though, is broader than these
requirements and broader than the former Consumer Fraud Act
of Illinois.
In the new Act, there is a provision defining trade and
commerce, 10 6 these terms being used for the first time. In so
defining, the Act refers to "any services and any property,
tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other
102.

ILL. REV. STAT.

103. Id.

ch.

121

,

§

270a(a)

(1973).

104. F.T.C. v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929).
105. Id. at 27-28.
106. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , § 261(f) (1973).

372

The John Marshall Journalof Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 9:351

article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated . . .
The relevancy is that the Little F.T.C. is directed toward legislative protection irrespective of the frequency of the transaction
and the magnitude of the offense; a one-time violation is just
as subject to action as that which is done continuously. Under
the old Act, there was a question as to the magnitude of the
offense as a prerequisite to the action but the repetitive use of
the word "any" should obviate the necessity of determining that
query.
This same section of the Little F.T.C. eliminates another
unanswered question: Is real estate included within the Act?
The definition of merchandise seemingly made it inclusive in the
Consumer Fraud Act'0 8 but the new Act makes specific refer-

ence to realty and any other tangible or intangible of value. 10 9
Thus, another possible problem under the old Act has been eliminated by a more comprehensive and flexible Little. F.T.C.
An example of the breadth of the Little F.T.C. was illustrated in the Chicago Sun-Times wherein a hypothetical was
presented. 1

0

In the article, a small businessman purchased a

barber shop and the seller had misrepresented the possible
income therefrom. Since these representations were material
and related to a purchase of something of value, either the
Attorney General or the purchaser could bring the action.
This hypothetical illustrates three important points. The first
is that the causes of action that may be brought are wide and
varied; second, the advantage to the parties bringing the action
is that they can now sue on a statute rather than the common
law action of fraud; and third, that the rights and duties are
clearly established by the precedents of the F.T.C. in establishing
standards of conduct. Even though there is a question of puffing
or expression of opinion as opposed to fact in the example, the
standards for evaluation come from a larger pool of case authorities than previously available.
Another problem which has been considered and resolved by
the F.T.C., and is thereby incorporated into the Little F.T.C., is
whether the violative conduct has been terminated before the
action was commenced. The cases under the F.T.C. Act have held
that having ceased the illegal conduct prior to the issuance of
a complaint does not absolve the violators"' and a voluntary
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id., § 261(b).
109. Id., § 261(f).

110. Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 1, 1973 at 6, col. 1.
111. Country Tweeds, Inc. v. F.T.C., 326 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1964);
Giant Food, Inc. v. F.T.C., 322 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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discontinuance is no bar to the action either.1 1 2 The purpose
of the cease and desist order in these instances is to insure that
the conduct will not occur again and consequently the order is a
preventative measure. Language of the Little F.T.C., and previously the Consumer Fraud Act, indicates the same results since
remedies may be had when a person "has engaged in, is engag11
ing in, or is about to engage in" an unlawful practice.
The new versatility of the Little F.T.C. comes primarily from
the frequent use of the expression "any" in defining trade and
commerce. The scope of possible actions has been broadened
to include all transactions involving property of value and these
dealings are subject to actions by either the Attorney General
or the individual purchaser. Since the draftsmen indicate such
a broad spectrum, no litigation should fail because of the value
of the property, the frequency of such transactions, the type
of property, or the termination of the practice prior to the litigation.
Injury Resulting From the Unlawful Practice
.Since there are so few decisions under the Consumer Fraud
Act, it is necessary to evaluate the decisions of the F.T.C. Act
in order to understand what types of injuries must be shown
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Little F.T.C.
In Ford Motor Co. v. F.T.C.,114 Ford had advertised 6%
financing of cars when the true time balance payments were
11.5%. The defense was raised that there was no proof that there
had been any damages. The court rejected the contention by
stating that "[t] he Federal Trade Commission Act was intended
to afford a preventative remedy, not a compensatory one, so that
the suggestion no damage has been shown . ..is no defense to
the proceeding."" ' 5
Also, there need not be evidence that anyone had in fact
been deceived in relying on the petitioner's representations" 6
and if damages should be alleged, it is not necessary to show
112. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. F.T.C., 379 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1967);
Clinton Watch Co. v. F.T.C., 291 F.2d 838, 841 (7th Cir. 1961).
113. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , § 263 (1973).

114. 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941).
115. Id. at 182.
116. F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149 (1942); F.T.C. v. Winsted
Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922); F.T.C. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d
669 (2d Cir. 1963); American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. F.T.C., 255 F.2d
289 (8th Cir. 1958); Herzfeld v. F.T.C., 140 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1944);
Bockenstette v. F.T.C., 134 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1943); Pep Boys-Manny,
Moe & Jack, Inc. v. F.T.C., 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941); F.T.C. v.
Hires Turner Glass Co., 81 F.2d 362, 364 (3d Cir. 1935); Brown Fence
& Wire Co. v. F.T.C., 64 F.2d 934, 936 (6th Cir. 1933); F.T.C. v. Balme,
23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1928).
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them in terms of specific dollar value 1' 7-only
some potential damage. The reason for this rule
simply as "the purpose of a cease and desist order
for past acts, but to prevent the occurrence or
continuance of illegal acts."11 8

that there was
has been stated
is not to punish
the threatened

Consequently, the Commission

has no intention of punishing the wrongdoer per se but rather
to protect the consumers. Justice would be affronted if the
wrongdoer were to continue the practice simply because specific
damages could not be proven.
These excerpts from the case law of the F.T.C. once again
illustrate standards by which the actions are measured. There are
no provisions in the Little F.T.C. expressing the aforementioned
rules but they are incorporated in the Act by virtue of the section stating that interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the courts shall be given consideration relating to
Section 5 (a) of the F.T.C. Act.1 19 As a practical matter it is important to bear in mind that specific proof of damages is not
essential to the cause of action; all that need be shown is the
probability of injury to either the consumer or competitor.
CONCLUSION
Besides those sections specifically referred to herein, other
portions of the Little F.T.C. alter the procedural aspects of the
Act 1 20 but the ones mentioned have the major substantive

effect with regard to consumer protection. When utilizing the
Act, particular attention must be focused on those standards
established under the F.T.C. Act, for those standards are what
make the Little F.T.C. such a reliable and substantial law; a law
which has numerous decisions to serve as a backbone, yet structured such that it is flexible enough to adapt to new situations
and deal with them according to what serves the community best.
The Act was drafted to allow private litigation where it was
previously forbidden or of little use, but safeguards are incorporated to prevent harassment litigation, thus protecting the
honest businessman.
The Act is a preventative measure, rather than a punitive

one, but if practices exceed certain permissible deviations, the
Attorney General may seek the revocation of a license or perhaps some other relief which would literally put the violator out
of business.

By the same token, an individual who has been,

117. Rothschild v. F.T.C., 200 F.2d 39, 42 (7th Cir. 1952); Consolidated
Book Publishers, Inc. v. F.T.C., 53 F.2d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 1931).
118. California Lumbermen's Council v. F.T.C., 115 F.2d 178, 184 (9th
Cir. 1940).
119. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , § 262 (1973).
120. Id., § 265 (Service of Process).
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or may be, injured by the conduct may be able to receive punitive damages from the violator.
The Act lessens the burden of proof by the complainant since
there need not be an element of intent on the part of the violator
should there be an affirmative misrepresentation. On the other
hand, the one failing of the Act is the requirement of proof of
intent where the misrepresentation arises from an omission or
suppression of material facts.
The Little F.T.C. forbids acts or practices which are unfair
towards consumers irrespective of whether the conduct is deceptive or unfair to competitors. The Act, by reference to the F.T.C.
Act, also dictates permissible conduct when the issue of the case
relates to practices directed against the public or a competitor
in advertising.
When all of the assets of the new Act are examined, the
total effect is an extremely broad and practical law which is
necessary to consumerism. The Little F.T.C. was designed to
be easily utilized by the consumer, competitor, or the Attorney
General, and sufficiently broad to cover situations which may
be novel enough to have evaded the prior law of Illinois. The
Little F.T.C. is an act which is necessary to the administration of
justice in the field of consumerism and one which should have
a beneficial effect on all who believe that the immense amount
of advertising in this state requires scrutiny to protect the public.
The Act is also essential in order to preserve "fairness" so that
consumers can live their lives without fear that an unscrupulous
merchant will take advantage of their less fortunate situation in
life.

The John Marshall Journal
Of Practice and Procedure
Volume 9

Number 2

Winter, 1975-76

Executive Board Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
RICHARD 0. WOOD

Editor-in-Chief
EUGENE E. GozDEcIu

FRANK C. ROWLAND
Lead Articles Editor

JOHN

Executive Editor

H. ANDERSON

JOSEPH N. BARCOTT

Candidacy Editor

Comments Editor
LJUBOMIR NACEV

Research Editor
THE ASSOCIATE BOARD
NEIL CovVr
Business Editor

AULEY M. CROUCH III

Lead Articles Editor
LoRENzo

E.

F. STAFFORD
Candidacy Editor

BRAcY

MARY

Comments Editor

STEPHEN S. MESSUTTA

Research Editor
STAFF
ROBERT ABRAHAM
STEPHEN ANTHONY
JANE BAILEY
DANIEL BAUER
FRED BAUER
JOHN BELLAVER
WILLIAM BRENNER

DANIEL BuTE
ROBERT CAIN
CURTIS CALVERT
CHARLES COLE
AL D'AGOSTINO
DANIEL DELANEY
STEVEN DELL
ERNEST DrBENEDETrO
BRUCE DUNN
CARY FLEISCHER
MARC GINSBERG
DAN GLASSMIRE

FRANK GRADISHAR
TOM HELMS
TODD HERBST
GLENN HERING
KURT HORBERG
CARYL JACOBS
LARRY JOHNSON
GREGORY JOHNSTON
GLEN KEYSOR
JAMES LAFFEY
DOUGLAS LINDSAY
RONALD LIPINSKI
RONALD LOKOS
JAMES LOURGOS
WILLIAM McGRATH
SALLY MENGO
MICHAEL MERMVEL
KATHLEEN MORRISON
GALE MURRIN

FACULTY ADVISOR
CLAUDE E. CARR, JR.

KEVIN MURNIGHAN
NANCY NEEDLES
LOREN OuRY
EDWARD PAPALIA
JOHN PIEPER
JIM PITTS
SANDRA POMRENZE
RICHARD PORTER
JAMES RADCLIFFE
GARY RAVITZ
CHARLES SCHMADEKE
KEN SOPHIE
CHERYL STEPHAN
THOMAS STRUEBER
GARY TAYLOR
VIRGIL THURMAN
ED USINGER
DANIEL WEILER

